Minimizing Flow-Time on Unrelated Machines

We consider some flow-time minimization problems in the unrelated machines setting. In this setting, there is a set of $m$ machines and a set of $n$ jobs, and each job $j$ has a machine dependent processing time of $p_{ij}$ on machine $i$. The flow-time of a job is the total time the job spends in the system (completion time minus its arrival time), and is one of the most natural quality of service measure. We show the following two results: an $O(\min(\log^2 n,\log n \log P))$ approximation algorithm for minimizing the total-flow time, and an $O(\log n)$ approximation for minimizing the maximum flow-time. Here $P$ is the ratio of maximum to minimum job size. These are the first known poly-logarithmic guarantees for both the problems.Comment: The new version fixes some typos in the previous version. The paper is accepted for publication in STOC 201

Constant-Competitive Prior-Free Auction with Ordered Bidders

A central problem in Microeconomics is to design auctions with good revenue properties. In this setting, the bidders' valuations for the items are private knowledge, but they are drawn from publicly known prior distributions. The goal is to find a truthful auction (no bidder can gain in utility by misreporting her valuation) that maximizes the expected revenue. Naturally, the optimal-auction is sensitive to the prior distributions. An intriguing question is to design a truthful auction that is oblivious to these priors, and yet manages to get a constant factor of the optimal revenue. Such auctions are called prior-free. Goldberg et al. presented a constant-approximate prior-free auction when there are identical copies of an item available in unlimited supply, bidders are unit-demand, and their valuations are drawn from i.i.d. distributions. The recent work of Leonardi et al. [STOC 2012] generalized this problem to non i.i.d. bidders, assuming that the auctioneer knows the ordering of their reserve prices. Leonardi et al. proposed a prior-free auction that achieves a $O(\log^* n)$ approximation. We improve upon this result, by giving the first prior-free auction with constant approximation guarantee.Comment: The same result has been obtained independently by E. Koutsoupias, S. Leonardi and T. Roughgarde

SELFISHMIGRATE: A Scalable Algorithm for Non-clairvoyantly Scheduling Heterogeneous Processors

We consider the classical problem of minimizing the total weighted flow-time for unrelated machines in the online \emph{non-clairvoyant} setting. In this problem, a set of jobs $J$ arrive over time to be scheduled on a set of $M$ machines. Each job $j$ has processing length $p_j$, weight $w_j$, and is processed at a rate of $\ell_{ij}$ when scheduled on machine $i$. The online scheduler knows the values of $w_j$ and $\ell_{ij}$ upon arrival of the job, but is not aware of the quantity $p_j$. We present the {\em first} online algorithm that is {\em scalable} ((1+\eps)-speed $O(\frac{1}{\epsilon^2})$-competitive for any constant \eps > 0) for the total weighted flow-time objective. No non-trivial results were known for this setting, except for the most basic case of identical machines. Our result resolves a major open problem in online scheduling theory. Moreover, we also show that no job needs more than a logarithmic number of migrations. We further extend our result and give a scalable algorithm for the objective of minimizing total weighted flow-time plus energy cost for the case of unrelated machines and obtain a scalable algorithm. The key algorithmic idea is to let jobs migrate selfishly until they converge to an equilibrium. Towards this end, we define a game where each job's utility which is closely tied to the instantaneous increase in the objective the job is responsible for, and each machine declares a policy that assigns priorities to jobs based on when they migrate to it, and the execution speeds. This has a spirit similar to coordination mechanisms that attempt to achieve near optimum welfare in the presence of selfish agents (jobs). To the best our knowledge, this is the first work that demonstrates the usefulness of ideas from coordination mechanisms and Nash equilibria for designing and analyzing online algorithms

An improved algorithm for incremental cycle detection and topological ordering in sparse graphs

We consider the problem of incremental cycle detection and topological ordering in a directed graph G = (V, E) with |V| = n nodes. In this setting, initially the edge-set E of the graph is empty. Subsequently, at each time-step an edge gets inserted into G. After every edge-insertion, we have to report if the current graph contains a cycle, and as long as the graph remains acyclic, we have to maintain a topological ordering of the node-set V. Let m be the total number of edges that get inserted into G. We present a randomized algorithm for this problem with Õ(m4/3) total expected update time. Our result improves the Õ(m • min(m1/2, n2/3)) total update time bound of [5, 9, 10, 7]. In particular, for m = O(n), our result breaks the longstanding barrier on the total update time. Furthermore, whenever m = o(n3/2), our result improves upon the recently obtained total update time bound of [6]. We note that if m = Ω(n3/2), then the algorithm of [5, 4, 7], which has Õ(n2) total update time, beats the performance of the time algorithm of [6]. It follows that we improve upon the total update time of the algorithm of [6] in the “interesting” range of sparsity where m = o(n3/2). Our result also happens to be the first one that breaks the lower bound of [9] on the total update time of any local algorithm for a nontrivial range of sparsity. Specifically, the total update time of our algorithm is whenever . From a technical perspective, we obtain our result by combining the algorithm of [6] with the balanced search framework of [10]

Truth and Regret in Online Scheduling

We consider a scheduling problem where a cloud service provider has multiple units of a resource available over time. Selfish clients submit jobs, each with an arrival time, deadline, length, and value. The service provider's goal is to implement a truthful online mechanism for scheduling jobs so as to maximize the social welfare of the schedule. Recent work shows that under a stochastic assumption on job arrivals, there is a single-parameter family of mechanisms that achieves near-optimal social welfare. We show that given any such family of near-optimal online mechanisms, there exists an online mechanism that in the worst case performs nearly as well as the best of the given mechanisms. Our mechanism is truthful whenever the mechanisms in the given family are truthful and prompt, and achieves optimal (within constant factors) regret. We model the problem of competing against a family of online scheduling mechanisms as one of learning from expert advice. A primary challenge is that any scheduling decisions we make affect not only the payoff at the current step, but also the resource availability and payoffs in future steps. Furthermore, switching from one algorithm (a.k.a. expert) to another in an online fashion is challenging both because it requires synchronization with the state of the latter algorithm as well as because it affects the incentive structure of the algorithms. We further show how to adapt our algorithm to a non-clairvoyant setting where job lengths are unknown until jobs are run to completion. Once again, in this setting, we obtain truthfulness along with asymptotically optimal regret (within poly-logarithmic factors)